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Our troubles with terrorism began 20 years ago, late in President Ronald Reagan's first term, on a quiet Saturday in March, when
Secretary of State George Shultz convened a meeting of terror experts.
Five months after the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in which 242 Americans were killed, and just a week after CIA
agent William Buckley was taken hostage, Shultz had grown concerned that terror was emerging as "a form of war for which we were
ill prepared." The goal of the meeting was to take the gloves off and consider all available options.
The gathering was organized by Brian Jenkins, an ex-Green Beret who was (and still is) a counter-terrorism specialist at Rand.
Jenkins brought together a lively, diverse group that hit it off well with Shultz. By the end of the day, they had come up with a plan for
waging a war on terror. It began with better information- sharing among law enforcement, intelligence and the military, and went on
to include both pre-emptive and retaliatory raids, targeted killings, deceptive sting operations and a host of other options.
Sound familiar?
Shultz took the recommendations from this one-day meeting to Reagan, urging him to act before terrorism grew to unmanageable
size. After a week of deliberations, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 138.
Although much of the document remains highly classified, the fragments that have been made public show that Shultz had persuaded
the president to start a war on terror along the lines that his group had recommended. An impressive outcome, given that it all
stemmed from a one-day seminar. Reagan's swift action in signing the new directive can only be admired.
Then disaster struck.
It took the form of bitter bureaucratic resistance spearheaded by arch- conservative Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. He and
other opponents of the new counterterror strategy complained to Reagan that it was vague and ill- focused. Weinberger then wrote
his own set of rules governing the use of force, which were intended to limit military actions to those that had full public support and
that would result in a swift victory along conventional lines. He left no room for waging a protracted hit-and-run campaign (which the
public might not even be aware of) against dispersed terrorist cells.
Reagan, who encouraged dissent among high-level advisers, allowed the debate to play itself out before starting the first phase of
operations in this new war. But neither Shultz nor Weinberger could be moved from their positions, so Reagan eventually chose a
course of action that gave both a little of what they wanted. This was a mistake whose consequences continue to be felt today.
Under Reagan, terror was to be confronted with force -- conventional force for the most part, and generally in retaliation rather than
as a preventive measure. It was a situation rich with irony, for the State Department was calling for an aggressive approach to the
problem, while the Pentagon demurred, agreeing to fight only when it had to and only in the usual, familiar way it preferred.
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Thus, when it came time to punish Libya's Moammar Khadafy, a major sponsor of terrorism, action came in the form of an ineffectual
air raid on Tripoli in 1986 and some naval engagements in the Gulf of Sidra. Khadafy's reply was to step up his terrorist activities,
culminating in the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, just before Christmas in 1988. All 259 people on board
were killed.
To be sure, there were occasional flashes of brilliance that showcased the great potential of the Shultz group's recommendations. For
example, a plan was crafted to deceive Abu Nidal, the most feared terrorist of the 1980s, into destroying his own network. While the
details remain classified, what can be reported is that his finances were penetrated. Instead of freezing accounts, funds were made to
disappear and reappear in ways that made it seem that his trusted operatives were skimming.
Abu Nidal had 100 killed
When he discovered this, Abu Nidal had more than 100 of his own people killed, a blow from which the organization never recovered.
All without an American shot fired.
But this was the exception to a rule that discouraged taking decisive action, so insurgent networks that we had nurtured in
Afghanistan -- to fight Russian occupiers during the 1980s -- were soon plotting to go after the United States, their far enemy.
Yet in the face of this looming threat, Reagan's successor, President George H.W. Bush, followed a policy line far closer to the
Weinberger Doctrine, busying himself with conventional wars in Panama and the Persian Gulf. He was much more concerned about
preventing the rise of any new great powers, so this was a period of growth for terrorists, who took full advantage of our inattention to
expand their networks.
President Bill Clinton followed the elder Bush in office and performed no better. In the face of mounting evidence an actual terror war
was under way against the United States, Clinton failed to rise to the challenge to act first articulated by Shultz in 1984.
Clinton wasn't galvanized by the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center or by the killing of American service members at Khobar
Towers in 1996. After the bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, Clinton merely launched an updated version of
Reagan's Tripoli raid, this time shooting missiles at an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan.
The next deadly terrorist attack, on the U.S. guidance missile destroyer Cole in 2000, went largely unanswered. This pattern of high-
level neglect of the terrorism problem continued right on into the presidency of George W. Bush, whose primary national security
strategy when he came into office emphasized, and still touts, deployment of ballistic missile defenses.
However, President Bush was shocked out of his complacency by the Sept. 11 attacks and finally realized we were in a full-blown war
with terrorists. By then it was more than 17 years since Shultz had first sounded the alarm, years when al Qaeda perfected its craft.
Riding our technology
Al Qaeda learned how to ride the rails of our technology to strike at us, and it designed a networked organizational form that
continues to give us fits as we try to disrupt or destroy their dispersed nodes.
To his credit, President Bush has begun going after terror networks in ways that echo some of the Shultz group's recommendations of
20 years ago.
But Bush's early focus on using conventional warfare against other nations, in particular the unnecessary invasion and occupation of
Iraq, shows the Weinberger Doctrine still exerts a powerful influence over high-level decision-makers. It keeps them on the well-worn
path toward finding the familiar rather than encouraging them to search out innovative alternatives. The task now is to rekindle the
spirit and ideas of those who foresaw the looming terrorist problem 20 years ago and crafted the right solutions back then. All it will
take to get things right is for the commander in chief, whether Bush or John Kerry, come January, to turn decisively away from the
staid conventional approaches to countering terror that have kept us bogged down for two decades.
This is easier said than done, given the bureaucratic feudalism that bedevils policy-making. If the Sept. 11 Commission's
recommendation to create several new layers of federal bureaucracy is embraced, future presidents will feel even more hamstrung
than Reagan did by the Shultz-Weinberger impasse.
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Still, presidents are commanders in chief, with both the power and the responsibility to pursue the right course. No amount of
bipartisan blame spreading should be allowed to distort this reality.
The way to cut this Gordian knot is to stop adding to our hierarchy and cultivate networks of our own, to build lateral connections
linking the operatives in our 15 intelligence agencies easily and directly.
A chief executive who encourages this won't need more bureaucracy and could finally bring an end to the misguided meandering that
has plagued counterterrorism policy at the highest level for too long.
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